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ABSTRACT
Information security using chaotic dynamics is a novel topic in the wireless sensor network (WSN) research ﬁeld. After 
surveying analog and digital chaotic security systems, we give a state of the art of chaotic S-Box design. The substitution 
tables are nonlinear maps that strengthen and enhance block crypto-systems. This paper deals with the design of new 
dynamic chaotic S-Boxes suitable for implementation on wireless sensor nodes. Our proposed schemes are classiﬁed into 
two categories: S-Box based on discrete chaotic map with ﬂoating point arithmetic (cascading piecewise linear chaotic map and 
a three-dimensional map) and S-Box based on discrete chaotic map with ﬁxed-point arithmetic (using discretized Lorenz map 
and logistic–tent map). The security analysis and implementation process on WSN are discussed. The proposed methods satisfy 
Good S-Box design criteria and exceed the performance of Advanced Encryption Standard static S-Box in some cases. The 
energy consumption of different proposals and existing chaotic S-Box designs are investigated via a platform simulator and 
a real WSN testbed equipped with TI MSP430f1611 micro-controller. The simulations and the experimental results show that 
our proposed S-Box design with ﬁxed-point arithmetic Lorenz map has the lowest energy-consuming proﬁle compared with 
the other studied and proposed S-Box design. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Chaos theory is an interesting ﬁeld of research dealing with
nonlinear, deterministic, and dynamic systems. It is applied
to many different domains such as physics, robotics,
biology, ﬁnance and encryption. The main important char-
acteristics of chaotic systems are the great dependency on
initial conditions (ICs) and parameters variation [1], ergo-
dicity, the random-like behavior, and simplicity. These
properties attract the researchers to develop chaotic
secure communication and crypto-systems. There are two
fundamental methods in modeling chaotic crypto-systems:
analog and digital [2]. The ﬁrst one is based on synchroni-
zation between two crypto-chaotic systems in a noisy
environment [3]. The second one does not depend on syn-
chronization, which is an important asset. In many digital
chaotic crypto-systems, constructing good dynamic substi-
tution boxes (S-Boxes) instead of static ones is the main is-
sue [4–11]. The S-Box is the only nonlinear component in
block ciphers and the principal source of confusion prop-
erty needed to conceive strong crypto-systems. All the pro-
posed approaches are studying the security and robustness
of chaotic dynamic S-Boxes. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no recent study dealing with the perti-
nence of such an approach for wireless sensor network
(WSN) security, and there are only some researches on
designing digital chaotic ciphers for WSNs. A WSN is a
network composed of active sensor nodes that have small
volume, restricted storage space, and restricted communica-
tion bandwidth with insufﬁcient battery power. The small
nodes are supposed to monitor, manipulate, and transmit
gathered insecure environmental information. The security
aspect is an emerging research challenge driven by the
limited battery resources. Therefore, designing an encryption
algorithm for WSN must take into account energy consump-
tion. The contribution of this paper is to propose new
dynamic S-Box approaches suitable for the WSN, and to
compare the new and existing methods’ security aspect and
energy consumption. In this paper, we present a brief over-
view of the analog and digital chaotic systems, in Section
2, as well as chaotic algorithms conceived for WSN and
gives chaotic dynamic S-Box design art state. Our proposed
algorithms for S-Box design are presented in Section 3. In
Section 4, we provide security analysis and comparison of
the different S-Boxes performances.
In Section 5, we adapt and implement the generated
S-boxes on a WSN simulator. In Section 6, we evaluate
the energy consumption of the different algorithms via
simulations and real measurements on an experimental
sensor SensLAB testbed. The ﬁnal section presents the
conclusion and future work.
2. RELATED WORK
Chaotic cryptography consists of two important para-
digms: analog and digital chaotic systems [2]. The ﬁrst par-
adigm is the analog chaotic communication systems. They
are based on synchronization of two chaotic systems in a
noisy environment [3]. Two chaotic systems can synchro-
nize through coupling. One or more scalar signals are sent
from one system to another or via a third external source.
One of the advantages of the analog or free chaos is the
ability to simultaneously encrypt and spread the signal.
This minimizes devices and saves energy. Jamming attack
is also difﬁcult to apply to these systems [12]. However,
analog chaotic systems face many deﬁciencies [12,13]:
• Two identical chaotic systems at least must be used to
establish a communication. It is not evident to
ﬁnd two similar devices; synchronization therefore
becomes more difﬁcult.
• Tiny signals and transmission noise are difﬁcult to
differentiate. Synchronization noise must have lower
intensity than the information signal.
• Synchronization time is hard to establish.
Moreover, the key space is reduced by the ineluctable
errors of the components values and the signal redundancy.
Many cryptanalyses are then possible [1,12]. For these dif-
ferent disadvantages, we are not going to consider analog
chaotic systems in the rest of this paper. The second para-
digm is the digital chaotic crypto-systems or ciphers,
which are designed for digital computers. Chaotic maps
are implemented in a ﬁnite precision [2]. We can classify
digital chaotic crypto-systems into two main categories:
chaotic stream ciphers and chaotic block ciphers.
2.1. Chaotic stream ciphers
Chaotic stream cipher encrypts each plaintext bit or byte
one by one. It mixes the pseudorandom cipher bit stream,
based on a chaotic map, with the plaintext bits using in
general an Exclusive Logical OR. This type of chaotic
cipher was introduced in1989 by Matthews when he pre-
sented a one-dimensional (1D) map with chaotic behavior
[14]. Sequences of pseudorandom numbers are generated
by this chaotic map and considered as a one-time pad
[12,15]. We will not deal in detail with the different meth-
ods using stream chaotic ciphers because our study focuses
on block ciphers.
2.2. Chaotic block ciphers
The block cipher encrypts blocks of bits with a length that
differs according to the deployed algorithm. The security
level of a chaotic block cipher is ﬁxed by the properties
and the implementation method of the chaotic function
[13]. Several chaotic block ciphers proposed in the bib-
liography apply the Feistel structure [15–18]. Chaotic
maps are employed to generate key streams or substitution
table named S-Box. However, if we consider the method-
ology using the chaotic map, other classiﬁcations can be
presented.
2.2.1. Chaotic block cipher for WSN
Recently, the interest of some researchers was focused
on designing chaotic crypto-systems for WSNs. These cha-
otic crypto-systems challenge widely known algorithms
such as RC5 [19], RC6 [20], and Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [21]. Chen et al. proposed in [22] an algo-
rithm based on the following 8-bit chaotic map:
y ¼ x≪2ð Þ $ x2
! "
≫6$ 1 (1)
where x and y are 8-bit unsigned integers. The operators
“≪” and “≫” are respectively right-bit shifting and left-
bit shifting.
Chaotic properties of this map are not proved in [22].
The input right 4 bits are enlarged into 1 byte and XORed
with the key k. The result is then iterated by the chaotic
map quoted before. Then, an exclusive OR (XOR) opera-
tion is applied to the high 4 bits and low 4 bits. The Feistel
structure is also used, but the number of rounds is too
small, which is not consistent with the principle of Feistel
structure. Some ﬂaws of this algorithm allowed its crypt-
analysis through differential attack [23].
Another chaotic security algorithm is presented in [24],
and the authors proposed a new chaotic map calledN-logistic–
tent with an enlarged data range. The N-logistic–tent map is
given by the following equations:
xnþ1 ¼ mxn N $ xn=mð Þ=N $ yn=2
ynþ1 ¼ b N $ N $ ynj jð Þ
#
(2)
where x2 (0,m.N), m2 (0,4), y2 (0, 2 *N), b2 [1,2],
N=2K, and m=2k with integers K and k.
Dealing with integers simpliﬁes the computation and
minimizes the consumption. The authors suggest using
4 bytes to represent N, and choosing xi and yi between
(0,m *N) and (0, 2 *N) respectively. The seed key is the
set (xi, yi, m, b, m, N), and the data is XORed with the
chaotic keys. We used this map to generate chaotic S-Box
as shown in Section 3.
2.2.2. Block cipher based on inverse chaotic systems
The proposed algorithms directly use the chaotic maps
to encrypt messages. For example, Habutsu et al. [25] iter-
ate the inverse of the skew tent map to encrypt information.
Biham in [26] cryptanalyzed Habutsu algorithm using
known-plaintext attack with 238 complexity [15,18]. The
skew tent map is piecewise linear, and in order to increase
security, a more complex map with strong nonlinearities
can be used. Masuda et al. [13] reused this map and ex-
panded the range of x and a in order to use integers instead
of real numbers. We are going to tackle this principle in a
more detailed way, in the construction of S-Box.
2.2.3. Chaotic block cipher based on rounded chaos
and S-Box
Another way to encrypt information using chaos is by
means of chaotic S-Box. The nonlinear substitution table or
S-Box represents the essential part of Feistel architecture.
To construct an S-Box, designers rely not only on this
categorization but also on exploiting chaotic pseudorandom
generators and on inspiring from chaotic stream ciphers.
2.3. S-Box design: state of the art
Some of dynamic S-Box designs consist in iterating a cha-
otic map (one dimension or more) and discretizing output
real values by different ways to create a matrix of integers
between 0 and 255. They sometimes apply rows and col-
umns rotation as well as permutations to enhance security
of the S-Box. The second alternative relies on expanding
data range of the chaotic map in use.
In this section, we will explain many designs of chaotic
S-Box.
2.3.1. S-Box based on real output of chaotic map
We are going to present three principal ways to design
S-Boxes using chaotic maps with real outputs.
The maps used in this subsection have a data output
range [0,1] or [$1, 1]; so, the values are signed ﬂoats.
• Assign integers to subintervals of the phase space:
The ﬁrst method was presented by Jakimoski in [15].
He proposed to discretize the Logistic map by dividing
the phase space into (n+ 1) equal intervals. After N itera-
tions and if the output, which has a unique input, falls in
the interval i, then assign to it the integer i.
Choose 256 inputs having a unique image and outputs,
respectively, and then assign a new magnitude between 0
and 255 to these elements.
In [4], the authors inspire the same principle and reduce
only the magnitude of n.
Using another chaotic map is also possible, and it was de-
scribed in [5] where the authors iterate a piecewise linear
chaotic map (PWLCM) to generate S-Box. The parameters’
range of the PWLCM is continuous. All the values in this
range guarantee the chaotic behavior, unlike the logistic
map or the Henon attractor whose interval limits’ deﬁnition
is not simple because of the existence of periodic windows
even where the chaos exists [2]. The PWLCM map has an
exponentially decreasing autocorrelation and an invariant
uniform density, which makes it suitable for chaotic
crypto-systems.
This kind of map was employed by many others to
create S-Box, and for instance, Wang et al. [6] conceived
a four-step function f(i,j,K) that generates a dynamic
S-Box. The set (i,j,K) is considered respectively: number
of iterations, subintervals number, and one of the random
permutations of the sequence {0, 1, 2, . . ., 2n$ 1}.
The steps of this function consist in dividing the phase
space into j subintervals and iterating the chaotic map i times.
The third step is to replace, in the sequenceK, the nth integer
knwith the jth integer kj if the chaotic map output is in the nth
subinterval. The fourth step is to modify the control parame-
ter b as stated by the following equation:
b ¼ 0:9þ 0:1 ( km= 2
n $ 1ð Þ (3)
To create i S-Box at the same time, the authors use i ran-
dom permutation sequences: K1, K2, K3, . . ., Ki, and repeat i
times the function f.
• Binary sequence generation from real outputs:
The second method to construct chaotic S-Box sug-
gested in [7] is to binarize the real outputs of the chaotic
maps. To have integers between 0 and 255 from a real
number, the idea is to obtain a binary sequence Bni and to
convert each 8 bits into an integer. A ﬂoat number x can
be represented as [7]:
x ¼ 0:b1 xð Þb2 xð Þb3 xð Þ⋯bi xð Þ; x 2 0; 1½ * (4)
the ith bit bi(x)2 {0,1} is deﬁned as
bi xð Þ ¼
X2i$1
r¼1
$1ð Þr$1θ
r=2ið Þ xð Þ (5)
where θt(x) is the following threshold function:
θt xð Þ ¼
0; if x < t
1; if x≥t
#
(6)
The n-length binary sequence is
Bni ¼ f xð Þ ¼ bi t
n xð Þð Þf g1n¼0 (7)
where t is the nth iterations of the chaotic map. Each real
output is binarized by applying the previous method, if
the integer exists then the chaotic map is iterated once
again. The S-Box is nonlinearly shufﬂed by applying a
two-dimensional baker map. Chen et al. in [8] correct
some errors in Tang’s paper [7] and enhance this method
by increasing the dimension of the baker map (from two
dimensional to three dimensional (3D)) and by using the
Chebyshev map to generate the random binary sequence.
• Spatiotemporal chaos:
Yuan et al. in their paper [9] used spatiotemporal chaos
to generate S-Box. The most used spatiotemporal chaotic
system is the coupled map lattice:
xnþ1 ið Þ ¼ 1$ eð Þf xn ið Þð Þ þ
e
2
f xn iþ 1ð Þð Þ þ f xn i$ 1ð Þð Þ½ *
(8)
where f is the logistic map used as a local map despite its
drawbacks and n and i are respectively the time index
and the lattice index. The initial lattice values are ﬁxed,
and the spatiotemporal system is iterated d times where
(d> 2N). Then, the lattice indexes are gathered in descend-
ing order from the maximum lattice to the minimum one.
The maximum lattice value is chosen if two identical
values occur. Finally, the S-Box 2n/2. 2n/2 is created.
2.3.2. S-Box based on integer outputs of chaotic
map
Inspired by Masuda’s method to discretize the tent
map [13], Tang et al. proposed in [11] to adapt the algorithm
in order to construct a dynamic S-Box. The skew tent map is
a customized tent map obtained by choosing a critical point
different from 0.5. It is deﬁned by the following equation:
fa xð Þ ¼
x
a
; if 0 < x≤a
x$ 1
a$ 1
; if a < x≤1
8><
>: (9)
The discretized map is given by the next equation:
FA ¼
M
A
X
) *
; if t < X≤A
M
M $ A
M $ Xð Þ þ 1
+ ,
; if A < X≤M
8><
>:
(10)
The authors proposed to randomly choose the IC X0
among the set {1,2, . . .,256} and then iterate the map more
than k times. The iteration number must be equal to 2.39 log 2
M+ 15 to satisfy chaotic properties.
Finally, we repeat the previous process until we have
256 elements to construct the S-Box. We suggest adding
repetition test to be sure of not having duplicate values.
3. THE PROPOSED ALGORITHMS
FOR S-BOX DESIGN
The principal concern of the presented S-Box design in the
previous section was the security issue that was already
proved by the authors. All the previous works are pre-
sented to enhance conventional ciphers. They do not take
into consideration the complexity or the time spent to con-
struct these S-boxes, and they are not designed for WSN
security. Thus, we are motivated to develop robust
S-Boxes with low power consumption, in order to be
implemented on wireless sensor nodes.
To evaluate the energy consumption, by simulation and
testbed platforms, for the S-Box design, we propose new
methods based on the combined use of two chaotic maps
with real and integer approaches.
3.1. A new S-Box based on real approach
with two chaotic maps
To improve nonlinearity and immunity against differential
attacks, cascading multiple chaotic structures seems to be
interesting [1]. The cryptanalysis will be more complex
as the output is established by many mixed chaotic
orbits. Thus, we get the idea to combine two chaotic
maps [27]–the ﬁrst one is 1D [28], and the second one is
3D–in order to construct 16. 16 S-Box. We proposed
two methods [28]. In the ﬁrst one, we iterate n times the
1D map after choosing randomly the ICs, and each three
outputs is the input of the 3D map. Then, we iterate the
3D map N times and get the Nth iteration of (xi,yi,zi) until
having 256 different values. We sort all values, and each
value is substituted by its rank [17]. We ﬁnally get a
16. 16 S-Box. In the second method, we keep the same
process but instead of substituting each value by its rank,
we change the real values by their hexadecimal representa-
tion and then convert them into integers from 0 to 255. We
repeat the procedure until we ﬁnd 256 different random
integers. Only one map can be used for the two ways to
create dynamic S-Box. More details are given in the article
[27]. Almost the same principle of sorting the chaotic
outputs to get their rank is inspired in [10]. The chaotic
map used is a continuous Lorenz map; then, solving this
equation is required to obtain the orbits. The authors
proposed to add rows and column shifting to the left and
a column rotation so that the generated S-Box does not
completely depend on the chaotic system.
3.2. A new S-Box based on integer approach
with two chaotic maps
Chaotic algorithm speed as well as hardware and software
feasibility are inﬂuenced by the use of ﬂoating point
arithmetic. On the contrary, ﬁxed-point arithmetic could
improve the speed and guarantee the feasibility. Fixed-
point arithmetic and simple chaotic systems are recom-
mended to accelerate the encryption speed and ensure
simple hardware and software implementation [29]. How-
ever, ﬁxed-point arithmetic may lead to a leak of informa-
tion. Short cycle length and convergence to a ﬁxed point
can probably occur.
The problem of short cycle length can inhibit chaotic
cryptography transition from theory to practice. Tao et al.
in [30] suggested the injection of perturbation to reinforce
chaotic cryptography. The modiﬁcation will affect the orbit
value or parameters or both at once.
The perturbation is periodic. It is triggered at t= 0. It can
be performed using a linear feedback shift register (LFSR)
or linear congruential generators.
To construct the S-Box, we used the discretized
Lorenz map mentioned in [31] and given by the following
equation:
xkþ1 ¼ xk þ s yk $ xkð ÞΔt
ykþ1 ¼ yk þ xk r$ zkð Þ $ yk½ *Δt
zkþ1 ¼ zk þ xkyk $ bzk½ *Δt
8<
: (11)
We choose the initial values x0, y0, and z0, and we iterate
the map n times where n≥ 10.
Applying the perturbation seems necessary like in [31]
because of the apparition of redundancy after a number
of iterations. So, the output of LFSR is XORed to yk + 1
and zk+ 1, whereas xk+ 1 is XORed to the integration step
as expressed in the following equation [31]:
ykþ1 ¼ ykþ1/LFSR
zkþ1 ¼ zkþ1/LFSR
Δt ¼ Δt/xkþ1
8<
: (12)
Contrary to the article [31], we limit the variables size
and the integration step to 2 bytes (16 bits). The integration
step is not static; it changes in each iteration. If the highest
4 bits of the LFSR are all zero, then the integration step is
set to the highest LFSR byte, else it is set to the lowest
byte. The highest and lowest bytes of the set (xk+ 1,yk+1,zk+1)
are stored in an S-table.
All previous steps are repeated until we have 256 differ-
ent integers from 0 to 255.
We also used the map presented in [26] to generate a
chaotic S-Box, but we choose to represent variables on
2 bytes only, where m= 4, m= 4, N= 214, and b= 2.
The double bytes representation has led to a conver-
gence toward a ﬁxed point. To remedy this problem, we
add a perturbation via an LFSR.
In the next section, we examine the performances of the
proposed S-Box to conﬁrm their immunity especially
against differential and linear cryptanalysis.
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The design of cryptographically good S-Boxes is based on
essential criteria, which are as follows:
(1) Nonlinearity.
(2) Strict avalanche criterion (SAC).
(3) Equiprobable input/output XOR distribution.
To apply these criteria, the ICs for different S-Boxes are
given in Table I.
4.1. Nonlinearity
Linear cryptanalysis consists in ﬁnding linear approxima-
tions of a cipher algorithm. The cryptanalysis tries to build
linear equations connecting input plaintext with output
encrypted text. For a given S-Box, all linear approxima-
tions are gathered in a linear approximation table. Each
element of the table is based on the following expression:
Lp ¼ max
a;b6¼0
# x 2 X; x1a ¼ f xð Þ1bf g $ 2n$1
2n$1
- .2
(13)
Lp is a linear approximation probability that measures the
nonlinearity of a given function f(x). # is the cardinality
of the set x, x1a is the parity of the binary product of x
and a, and a, b2 {1, 2, . . ., 2n$ 1}.
In fact, each element of the table represents the number
of equality between the linear equation of the input sum
and the linear equation of the output sum. The result is then
divided by the total number of possible inputs. The linear
probability approximations of the S-Box are based on the
two maps combination for the ﬁrst and second methods
(described in [27]), and the S-Box of the N-logistic–tent
map are respectively 0.0625, 0.0705, and 0.0881. On the
other hand, the Lorenz S-box Lp is 0.0976. These obtained
values are close to the results in [7,8,15,17], which are
respectively 0.0706, 0.0706, 0.0625 and 0.088135.
Hence, our proposed S-Boxes are secure against linear
cryptanalysis because their linear probability approxima-
tions are among the lowest ones.
4.2. Strict avalanche criterion
Webster and Tavares in [32] introduced the SAC to test the
S-Boxes. According to them, an f function satisﬁes this cri-
terion if each 1-bit input changes half of each output bit
change. Indeed, a dependence matrix might be calculated.
To calculate the dependence matrix, we produce ﬁrst an
m-bits cipher vector s from an n-random bits vector e. Two
sets of n vectors (e1, e1,. . ., en) and (s1, s2,. . ., sn) are then cre-
ated, such that ej and e differ only in 1 bit j, and sj= f(ej).We
calculate also a set of avalanche vectors (v1, v2,. . ., vn) by ap-
plying an XOR between s and si. The next step is to add the
ith bit of vj to the element aij of the dependencematrix A. The
previous step is repeated for k random vectors e, and each el-
ement of the matrix is divided by k. The resulting value aij
varied from 0 to 1. A unit value means that the bit i should
change each time the bit j is complemented. A half value
means that the cryptographic function satisﬁes the SAC.
Table I. Initial conditions of the proposed S-Boxes.
Proposed S-Box based on Initial condition
Two chaotic maps (ﬁrst method) p=0.15, x0=0.7
Two chaotic maps (second method) p=0.15, x0=0.7
N-logistic–tent map Y=30000, x=1200
Discretized Lorenz map x=0, y=220, z=6210
The corresponding dependence matrices of our pro-
posed methods described earlier are given in Tables II–V.
The mean value of each matrix is respectively 0.4993,
0.4998, 0.5105, and 0.5054, which are so close to the
perfect value 0.5, so the S-Boxes satisfy the SAC. These
values are equal or even better than the results in the
following references [6,7,10,11,15] as well as the static
S-Box. The mean values of their dependence matrices are
respectively 0.5125, 0.4993, 0.5048, 0.4923, 0.4972, and
0.5069.This order is not the same as that in the paper.
4.3. Equiprobable input/output XOR
distribution
Biham and Shamir introduced in [33] the differential crypt-
analysis for an S-Box. It is based on the disproportion in
the input/output XOR distribution table, so an S-Box
resists the differential cryptanalysis attack if it has an equi-
probable input/output distribution. The complexity of the
differential attack is measured by the differential approxi-
mation probability of a map f (DPf).
Table II. Dependence matrix of the S-Box based on two chaotic maps (ﬁrst method).
0.4392 0.5490 0.4392 0.3765 0.4706 0.5020 0.4863 0.5020
0.4392 0.5176 0.5333 0.5647 0.5490 0.4549 0.4863 0.5804
0.5020 0.5333 0.5490 0.5490 0.4706 0.5176 0.5020 0.5333
0.4863 0.4549 0.4392 0.5804 0.5804 0.4235 0.4549 0.4863
0.4706 0.4863 0.5020 0.5804 0.4549 0.4706 0.5647 0.4235
0.5333 0.5490 0.4863 0.4863 0.5333 0.5647 0.5490 0.4549
0.4863 0.5804 0.4863 0.5176 0.5020 0.5176 0.4392 0.5333
0.5020 0.4392 0.4706 0.4863 0.5176 0.5176 0.4392 0.4549
Table III. Dependence matrix of the S-Box based on two chaotic maps (second method).
0.5804 0.4706 0.5490 0.5020 0.5333 0.5020 0.4549 0.5804
0.5020 0.4392 0.4863 0.5020 0.5020 0.4549 0.5176 0.4863
0.4706 0.5020 0.4863 0.5020 0.5020 0.5176 0.4863 0.4392
0.5176 0.6118 0.4863 0.5333 0.5020 0.5020 0.4392 0.4863
0.4078 0.4392 0.5333 0.5490 0.4706 0.5333 0.5647 0.5333
0.5490 0.5647 0.4706 0.5333 0.4706 0.5333 0.5490 0.4706
0.5333 0.4706 0.5176 0.4549 0.4863 0.5333 0.4549 0.4392
0.5647 0.5020 0.4706 0.4392 0.4549 0.5020 0.5176 0.4235
Table IV. Dependence matrix of the S-Box based on N-logistic–tent map.
0.5020 0.5333 0.5176 0.5020 0.5020 0.5647 0.4235 0.5176
0.5176 0.5333 0.4706 0.5020 0.5647 0.5020 0.4863 0.5020
0.4235 0.5020 0.6118 0.5490 0.4706 0.5490 0.5020 0.5490
0.4706 0.4706 0.5020 0.5804 0.5020 0.4863 0.4706 0.5333
0.5647 0.5490 0.5333 0.5020 0.5333 0.5020 0.5020 0.5490
0.4706 0.4863 0.4863 0.5020 0.4863 0.3922 0.4863 0.4706
0.4863 0.4863 0.5490 0.4706 0.4863 0.5804 0.4863 0.5647
0.5333 0.5490 0.5490 0.5647 0.4863 0.5176 0.5176 0.5176
Table V. Dependence matrix of the S-Box based on Lorenz map.
0.4549 0.5020 0.5176 0.5020 0.5647 0.4549 0.4706 0.5020
0.5490 0.4863 0.5333 0.5176 0.6118 0.5020 0.5333 0.4549
0.4863 0.5176 0.5176 0.5020 0.4392 0.5804 0.4549 0.5647
0.5176 0.5647 0.5490 0.5333 0.4549 0.5020 0.5176 0.5333
0.5020 0.5020 0.5490 0.5020 0.5020 0.5020 0.5490 0.4863
0.5490 0.4235 0.5333 0.4863 0.4706 0.4706 0.4863 0.5176
0.5176 0.4392 0.4392 0.5333 0.5333 0.4863 0.5020 0.4549
0.5333 0.5333 0.4235 0.5020 0.5490 0.5020 0.4706 0.5020
Dp ¼ max
Δx 6¼0;Δy
# x 2 X; f xð Þ/f x/Δxð Þ ¼ Δyf g
2n
- .
(14)
where 2n is the cardinality of all the possible input
values (x), Δx is the input differential, and Δy is the
output differential.
The occurrence frequency of the most probable output
XOR is represented by the differential approach table.
Tables VI–IX represent differential approach tables of
the proposed S-Boxes. We notice that the DPf of each table
is 10/256, which is equal to the results in the following
articles [5–7,10,11]. The DPf in Jakimoski’s [15] and
Chen’s [8] papers is 12/256.
Thus, the proposed S-Boxes have equiprobable
input/output XOR distribution and could resist differen-
tial attack.
Security analysis of our S-Boxes shows how good they
are. In fact, our approaches almost satisfy the criteria for a
cryptographically secure S-Box, so they can resist linear
and differential attacks with similar or even better perfor-
mances than the existing propositions.
The current results encourage us to propose an implemen-
tation of these dynamic chaotic S-Boxes for secure WSN.
5. IMPLEMENTATION ON WIRELESS
SENSOR NETWORK
We implement our chaotic dynamic on WSN to secure
information. In our case, dealt with in this section, we im-
plement the AES algorithm and a modiﬁed AES algorithm
where we use a dynamic S-Box instead of the static one.
The challenge is to design an approach that fulﬁlls the
Table VI. Differential approach table of the S-Box based on two
chaotic maps (ﬁrst method).
– 8 6 6 10 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 8 6
6 8 8 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 4 8 6 6 8
6 6 8 6 8 8 8 6 6 8 6 6 10 6 8 6
8 8 4 6 8 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8
6 8 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 6 6
8 6 6 8 8 8 6 8 6 10 6 6 8 6 8 8
6 8 6 4 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6
6 6 6 6 8 8 8 8 6 6 6 6 8 6 8 6
6 8 6 10 8 6 8 6 10 6 8 6 6 6 8 8
4 8 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6
6 6 6 6 10 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 6 6 8 8
6 8 8 6 8 8 6 6 8 8 6 6 8 8 6 8
4 6 6 6 6 6 8 10 6 8 6 6 8 6 6 6
6 8 8 8 10 6 6 6 8 8 6 8 6 8 8 6
6 10 6 8 6 8 6 6 6 8 6 10 6 8 8 8
8 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 6
Table VII. Differential approach table of the S-Box based on
two chaotic maps (second method).
– 6 6 8 8 8 8 6 6 8 8 6 8 6 8 6
6 8 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 10 10 6
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 8 6 8 8 6 6 8
4 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 8 6 8 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 8 8 6 6 6 8 8 8 8 6 8 8 6
6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10 6 8 6 6
8 6 6 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 6 6 8 6 6 6
6 8 8 6 6 8 8 6 8 8 8 6 8 10 8 6
6 6 6 8 8 6 6 4 6 8 6 6 8 6 6 6
8 8 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 8 6 4 6 8 6 6
6 6 8 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 8 8 8 6 6
6 6 8 4 6 6 6 6 6 10 6 6 6 8 6 8
6 6 8 6 6 6 8 8 6 6 8 6 8 6 6 6
10 6 6 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 8 8 6 10 10 6
8 6 6 6 8 10 8 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6
10 6 6 6 8 8 6 6 6 8 8 6 8 6 8 6
Table VIII. Differential approach table of the S-Box based on N-
logistic–tent map.
– 8 8 6 8 6 6 6 6 8 6 10 8 6 6 6
8 6 4 6 8 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6
6 6 6 8 6 6 6 8 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 6
8 6 6 6 8 8 6 8 6 6 6 8 8 6 8 6
8 8 6 10 8 8 6 6 8 6 6 8 8 8 6 8
10 6 6 6 6 8 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 6 8
8 8 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 10 6 6 8
8 6 6 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8
6 6 8 6 6 6 8 8 6 8 6 6 6 8 6 6
6 6 6 8 6 6 6 4 6 8 6 6 6 8 6 8
6 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 6 6 10 6 6 6 6 8
6 8 8 8 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8
8 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 8 6 6 6 6 6
8 10 8 10 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 8 6
6 6 8 8 8 8 6 10 6 8 8 4 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 8 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8
Table IX. Differential approach table of the S-Box based on
Lorenz map.
– 6 8 6 6 6 8 8 6 6 6 8 6 8 8 6
6 8 8 8 6 6 8 8 8 6 6 6 4 8 8 6
8 8 8 6 6 10 8 8 6 6 6 10 6 8 6 8
6 8 6 6 8 6 6 8 6 6 8 6 6 6 8 6
6 6 10 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8
8 8 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 8
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 10 6 6 6 6 8 8 8
6 6 10 10 10 8 8 6 6 8 6 6 8 6 6 6
8 8 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 8 8 10 8 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 6 6 6 10 6 6
6 4 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6
6 8 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 8 6 8 8
6 6 6 6 8 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 10 6 6 8
6 8 8 6 6 6 8 8 4 6 6 8 6 6 8 4
6 4 6 8 6 8 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 4 8 8
8 6 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 6
requirements of such network and to propose a communi-
cation protocol in order to guarantee the synchronization
of the dynamic S-Box generation.
Wireless sensor network is based on small sensor nodes
with limited energy, memory, and computational resources
[34–36]. Energy consumption is very critical because the
nodes are equipped with limited lifetime battery and repla-
cing them is not always an option. These limitations make
security services, especially computationally complex cryp-
tographic algorithms, more difﬁcult to implement in WSNs.
For this purpose, we used WSim [37] and WSNet [38]
simulators to test the proposed S-Boxes and compare their
performance especially concerning the energy consumption.
We carry out our codes on WSim MSP430 platform
simulator, which is equipped with an MSP430f1611 mi-
cro-controller and a TI CC1100 radio chipset. A 16-byte
plaintext is encrypted and then transmitted to other nodes
with a token ring protocol.
As seen in Section 2.3, designing chaotic S-Box is
arranged in two categories. The ﬁrst one deals with real
outputs of chaotic maps, and the second one is related to
integer chaotic map outputs. As we said before, there is
no implementation of dynamic chaotic S-Box in WSN,
so we implement only two principal proposed designs that
we found in the literature to compare their performance
with our proposed methods. For the ﬁrst category, we
chose to implement the assignment of integers to the phase
space subintervals by dividing intervals. It seems simpler
and adequate to WSNs. Even though there are many pro-
posed methods in the literature, they all have the same
principle. For this reason, we implement a uniﬁed model
given in the following pseudo-code:
For simplicity and consumption reasons, we chose to
restrict the dimensions of the used maps to a 1D PWLCM
map.
To simplify integer values assignment of each real cha-
otic map output, we choose the assignment by dichotomy
or binary search (Method 2). The binary search function
halves the search space, reﬁnes the search by dividing
intervals by multiples of two, and tests the existence of
the real value (output) in the interval in question. If it is
true, the function returns the interval position. The maxi-
mum number of tests is the ﬁrst exponent of 2 greater than
or equal to the possible intervals number N. It can be
deﬁned by the following equation:
M ¼ log2 Nð Þð Þ (15)
If we do not have repetitions, the maximal number of
intervals is 256. We will apply eight tests to each chaotic
output value. Given that we have 256 values, the total
number of tests is 2048.
Figure 1 shows the iteration number that we need to
construct the S-Box for a speciﬁc IC. The mean value is
2376, which indicates that many states fall in the same
intervals and generate repetitions.
We also calculate the occurrences of each iteration
number that we illustrate by Figure 2.
In this ﬁgure, the iteration numbers are gathered by
intervals of 100. The most probable iteration numbers are
between 1400 and 1500. This value represents only 28%
of the total.
The binary sequence generation from real outputs pro-
posed in [7], when implemented, appears very computa-
tional in resources; so, we only test the binarization
function, and every real output of a PWLCM map is trans-
formed via Equation (5) to 8 bits.
We also implement our approach based on sorting the
array and getting the rank of each output (Method 1).
The control parameters and the ICs form a part of the mod-
iﬁed system key. The sort function is the most complex
one in our algorithm. We choose a fast and non-recursive
sorting algorithm, which is the well-known Combsort al-
gorithm. For 106 tested ICs, there are no repetitions of
the outputs. Therefore, for any ICs, we get the S-Box after
256 iterations.
On the other hand, in the second category (integer
approach), we implement three methods: the S-Box pro-
posed by Tang in [11] based on the discretized skew Tent
map (Method3) and our contributions constructed respec-
tively with the discretized Lorenz map (Method 4) and
the N-logistic–tent map (Method 5). The pseudo-code of
the S-Box based on the discretized Lorenz map is given
in Algorithm2. For both approaches, we used a 16-bit
Fibonacci LFSR.
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Figure 1. Iteration number depending on initial conditions with
0.0001 step.
In order to ﬁnd the number of iterations needed to con-
struct the S-Boxes for different ICs, we try to do an ex-
haustive search, which appears impossible to us because
of the huge number of possibilities of the ICs (about 248
combinations for the S-Box based on discretized Lorenz
map and 232 for the S-Box based on N-logistic–tent
map). We divide the intervals and sweep the values with
a variable step, and then, we ﬁnd the minimal iteration
number and their occurrences.
Figure 3 illustrates the occurrences of minimal iteration
numbers for different ICs of the discretized Lorenzmap S-Box.
The most probable minimal iteration number is 151.
The lowest and the highest numbers of iterations are re-
spectively 124 and 233, which occur only once.
Figure 4 shows the occurrences of the minimal iteration
number of the N-logistic–tent map S-Box. For different
ICs, 320 is the most probable minimal number of itera-
tions. After deﬁning the implemented codes and counting
the iteration numbers of each one, we notice that some of
our codes lead to obtain 16. 16 S-Boxes after more than
28 iterations. The complexity of the algorithms and the it-
eration numbers strongly affect the energy consumption
evaluated in the next section.
6. ENERGY CONSUMPTION
In this section, we present, in details, the simulation and
the experimental results about energy consumption of our
different proposed S-Boxes with the IC presented in Ta-
ble I. For the S-Boxes based respectively on discretized
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Figure 2. Occurrences of iteration number interval.
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Figure 3. Occurrences of minimal iteration numbers with differ-
ent initial conditions for Lorenz map.
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Figure 4. Occurrences of minimal iteration numbers with differ-
ent initial conditions for N-logistic–tent map.
Lorenz map and N-logistic–tent map, these ICs match with
the highest number of iterations.
6.1. Simulation results of energy
consumption
The energy proﬁle is estimated via eSimu. eSimu is an en-
ergy consumption simulator for WSN nodes. It estimates
energy proﬁle via WSim traces [39,40].
Figure 5 illustrates the energy consumption (10$4 J) of
ﬁve approaches. The ﬁrst and the second one (Method 1
and Method 2, respectively) are based on real output cha-
otic maps. Dividing the phase space with dichotomy
(Method 2) is not suitable to assign integer values to the
chaotic state. Sorting the outputs (Method 1) appears less
energy consuming with 63.726. 10$4 J, which is a static
value for all the ICs.
The three last approaches (Method 3, Method 4, and
Method 5) are based on chaotic maps with integer
outputs. The S-Box based on Lorenz map (Method 4) has
the lowest consumption rate with only 1.92234. 10$4 J.
However, Method 3 proposed in [11] consumes
779.338. 10$4 J for Kmin = 35.
The consumption of the ﬁfth approach (Method 5)
based on N-logistic–tent map is close to the ﬁrst one with
59.397. 10$4 J.
Intuitively choosing a discretized chaotic map is
less computational and more suitable for WSN implemen-
tation because of the ﬁxed-point representation simplicity
and speed.
However, Method 3 consumes more than the real
chaotic map approaches. The discretized skew tent
map relies on relatively complex operations such as di-
vision, ceil, and ﬂoor operations as well as the thresh-
old function, which is also the binary search operation
base function.
The choice of the chaotic map, the simplicity of the
algorithm, and the adequate arithmetic representation are
determinant to implement a low-cost chaotic S-Box.
The second part of this section is to compare the
energy consumption that adds the generation of dynamic
chaotic S-Box when used in the AES algorithm instead
of the static one.
Figure 6 shows the energy consumption of each AES
function needed to encrypt 16 bytes with 128-bit AES. We
notice that the “mixsubcolumn” and “inv-mixsubcolumn”
are the most consumer AES functions. The “mixsubcolumn”
gathers the “subbyte” and “mixcolumn” functions. It uses the
S-Box to substitute each byte of the state matrix and then
multiplies the resulted columns with a ﬁxed polynomial.
On the other hand, the “inv-mixsubcolumn” regroups the
“inv-subbyte” and the “inv-mixcolumn”. The following
pseudo-codes represent a portion of the “mixsubcolumn”
and the “inv-mixsubcolumn” lines of code.
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Figure 5. Energy consumption of proposed and tested S-Boxes.
The ﬁrst line given in the “Mixsubcolumn” consumes
0.00925. 10$4 J, and it is called 16 times to construct
the new state matrix. The total consumption is then
0.148. 10$4 J. The “inv-mixsubcolumn” adds a loop
function (shown in Algorithm 4), which consumes
0.0876. 10$4 J. It explains the energy difference between
the two AES functions. On the other side, Figure 7 presents
the surplus of energy consumption of the modiﬁed AES
when compared with the static one. Despite the low energy
cost of certain dynamic S-Box design methods, the energy
surplus (4.31. 10$4 J for the best one) is still a drawback
that the dynamic aspect adds to the static AES algorithm.
We can compensate this disadvantage by reducing the
size of the S-Boxes and increasing the frequency of their
generation.
In order to validate the simulations results, we manage
to do some experiments with “real-world” conditions.
6.2. Experimental measurements of energy
consumption
The experiments were realized on SensLAB platform,
which is a very large-scale open WSN testbed [41]. It con-
tains 1024 ﬁxed and mobile sensor nodes deployed on four
different sites with a distributed topology. SensLAB allows
interacting with sensors such as real-time energy consump-
tion measurement, radio activity monitoring, and data
retrieval in real time. Each sensor has a TI MSP430f1611
micro-controller with a 16-bit processor running at
8MHz. The radio interface is TI CC1101 (open MAC
protocol) or CC2420 (Zigbee/IEEE 802.15.4) with a
frequency of 868MHz and 2.4GHz, respectively. We ﬂash
our ﬁrmwares associated with the conﬁguration parameter
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Figure 7. Surplus of energy consumption of the modiﬁed AES.
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
AES functions
En
cry
pti
on
Mi
xsu
bc
olu
mn
Sh
iftr
ow
De
cry
pti
on
Inv
mi
xsu
bc
olu
mn
Inv
sh
iftr
ow
En
er
gy
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
(e−
4J
)
0.00993
0.152
0.062
0.01082
0.23816
0.062
Figure 6. Energy consumption of AES functions.
sets (called proﬁle) on SensLAB nodes. The proﬁle
includes a conﬁguration of node monitoring measurement
and a power supply mode. Figure 8 represents the energy
consumption measurements of each code simulated in the
previous subsection. The experimental results show that
Method 4 and Method 3 are respectively the lowest and
highest chaotic algorithms, with energy consumption of
16.32. 10$4 J and 1604.47. 10$4 J, respectively. These
measurements match the eSimu results in terms of algo-
rithms consumption order but seem to be more consuming
compared with the simulations. These differences can be
explained by the simulator energy models approximations
that can affect especially fast algorithms.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we give a state of the art of the chaotic
crypto-systems, with special focus on the dynamic chaotic
S-Box design. The S-Box is considered as the core of
many well-known algorithms such as Data Encryption
Standard and AES. Many studies on algebraic attacks are
carried out in order to write these S-Box with few and sim-
ple algebraic relations. The chaos theory provides a way to
strengthen encryption algorithms or to design a new one
totally based on chaos. We propose some chaotic S-Box
design that we classify into two categories: S-Box based
on real output of chaotic map and S-Box based on integer
outputs of chaotic maps. We demonstrate that the proposed
designs satisfy good S-Box criteria and can resist popular
cryptanalysis: differential and linear attacks.
The ﬁnal part of this paper describes the implementa-
tion of the dynamic S-Box, which replaces the static AES
S-Box on WSNs. Some implementation requirements are
proposed to optimize intuitively the time and the energy
cost that we studied with eSimu.
Each proposed algorithm is implemented on WSim
MSP430 platform simulator, which is equipped with
MSP430f1611 micro-controller models with only
16-bit operations.
For WSN, using ﬂoating point seems to be inadequate.
Hence, using discretized maps and limiting the outputs to
only 16 bits (2 bytes) are deemed necessary. Unfortunately,
they affect the chaotic properties of the discretized Lorenz
and N-logistic–tent maps in that they generate short cycle
lengths and repetitions. To remedy these problems, we
inject a perturbation via a linear feedback register.
We found that although modular or free chaos adds a
dynamic aspect and robustness, it increases AES encryp-
tion/decryption functions’ energy consumption. Simula-
tions showed that the energy surplus of the best S-Box
design method is 4.31. 10$4 J. The idea is to reduce the
size of the S-Box and increase the frequency of its genera-
tion in order to reduce energy consumption.
An implementation on real WSN platform SensLAB
as well as experimental energy measurements are
carried out. The experimental results are approximately
twice as much as the simulations, which means that
WSim models are more optimistic and do not ﬁt fast
algorithms. Future work will focus on a self-organized
protocol based on dynamic S-Boxes and a fully chaotic
crypto-system for WSNs.
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